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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMIENT -

MONEY AND TEMPORARY ALIMONY. -

DIVORCE ACTION -

SUIT

The respondent in a divorce

action sought by prohibition to prevent a judge from enforcing an
attachment pending in his court. Respondent was sued for a divorce in West Virginia, and being a nonresident, service was had
by publication. Later complainant filed an affidavit for attachment on the ground that respondent was a nonresident, and asserted
that she was entitled to suit money and temporary alimony. The
Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company, respondent's employer in
Virginia, was suggested on the attachment and answered that it
owed respondent wages, whereupon the railroad was ordered by
the court to pay the amount due to the clerk of the court who
thereafter paid it to complainant's attorney. Writ of prohibition
awarded. Held, that attachment being a harsh remedy, purely
statutory, and hence to be strictly construed, our attachment statute
covering any claim or debt arising out of contract, or damages for
any wrong, would not be construed to include a claim for suit
money and temporary alimony. De Lung v. Baer.'
There are very few cases on this problem of permitting an
attachment in a divorce action before there has been a decree. The
majority of these cases permit such an attachment, but it should
be noted that they were decided under statutes expressly permitting attachment in a divorce action.2 In only one case was an
attachment of this kind permitted without express statutory authorization.3 But a number of cases hold that the wife's inchoate right
to alimony makes her a creditor of the husband, so that under a
statute against fraudulent conveyances, she might have her husband's attempted conveyance of realty to avoid payment of ali1189 S. E. 94 (W. Va. 1936).

2 Daniels v. Morris, 54 Iowa 369, 6 N. W. 532 (1880) ; Smith v. Smith, 61
Iowa 138, 15 N. W. 867 (1883) ; Sebree v. Sebree, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 670, 99 S.
W. 282 (1907); Cecil v. Cecil, 200 Ky. 453, 255 S. W. 64 (1923); Smith v.
Smith, 120 Me. 379, 115 Atl. 87 (1921); Burrows v. Purple, 107 Mass. 428,
434 (1871) ; Hill v. Hill, 196 Mass. 509, 82 N. E. 690 (1907) ; Poleti v. Poleti,
75 N. H. 607, 76 Atl. 191 (1910).
3 Forrester v. Forrester, 155 Ga. 722, 118 S. E. 373 (1923).
In this case
the Georgia court said that equity had jurisdiction to attach independently of
statute; but the West Virginia court has decided that attachment is purely
statutory in this state, as shown by the cases of Delaplain & Co. v. Armstrong
& Ulrich, 21 W. Va. 211 (1882) ; Cosner's Adm'r v. Smith, 36 W. Va. 788, 15
S. E. 977 (1892); Home Distilling Co. v. Himmel, 74 W. Va. 756, 82 S. E.
1094 (1914); Lamb v. Kelley, 97 W. Va. 409, 416, 125 S. E. 102 (1924).
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mony set aside.4 And there are cases permitting the enforcement
of an allowance of alimony from the property of an absent defendant, seized at the commencement of the divorce action by attachment or similar process.' This implies that the wife's right
of alimony is regarded in some states as a definite equitable claim
against the real or personal property of the nonresident defendant.
Thus it seems that the West Virginia Supreme Court might have
reached an opposite result under our statute and have found that
the wife's claim for alimony and suit money was such an equitable
claim as was contemplated by our statute of attachment.
On the other hand, it has been decided that even after the
decree for alimony has been made, attachment would not lie, for it
was regarded as not being a "debt" under the attachment statute,
since there might be imprisonment for failure to pay alimony, and
if this were regarded as a "debt", it would be imprisonment for
debt in violation of the law of the state.' In the principal case
there had been no personal service on the respondent, and it has
been held on numerous occasions that decrees for suit money and
alimony are personal decrees, enforceable only where there has been
personal service.7 In West Virginia a decree for alimony and
suit money has been considered not a debt, in order that there
might be no violation of the provision against imprisonment for
debt, when a person is attached for contempt for failure to pay
the amount decreed.'
The courts have recognized that the marital relation gives
rise to higher obligations than those arising from contract and tort,
and one of these obligations is the duty of the husband to support
the wife. The right of the wife to suit money to prosecute her
divorce action has also become almost a matter of right. Therefore
it would seem that the wife should be entitled to attach the
property of a nonresident respondent to protect these rights. But
under the West Virginia attachment statute as construed in this
4 Livermore v. Boutelle, 77 Mass. 217, 220 (1858) ; Thurston v. Thurston, 58
Minn. 279, 59 N. W. 1017 (1894); Murray v. Murray, 115 Cal. 226, 274, 47
Pac. 37 (1896); Hinds v. Hinds, 80 Ala. 225, 227 (1885).
r Hanscom v. Hanscom, 6 Colo. App. 97, 39 Pac. 885 (1895); Thurston v.
Thurston, 58 Minn. 279, 59 N. W. 1037 (1894); Wood v. Price, 79 N. J. Eq.
1, 9, 81 Atl. 1093 (1910) (statutory provision).
a Toth v. Toth, 242 Mich. 23, 217 N. W. 913 (1928).
7 Baylies v. Baylies, 196 App. Div. 677, 188 N. Y. S. 147 (1921); Bridges
v. Bridges, 46 R. I. 191, 125 AtI. 281 (1924); Baker v. Baker, 136 Cal. 302,
68 Pac. 971 (1902); Hood v. Hood, 130 Ga. 610, 61 S. E. 471 (1908); Coger
v. Coger, 48 W. Va. 135, 35 S. E. 823 (1900).
8 Smith v. Smith, 81 W. Va. 761, 765, 766, 95 S. E. 199 (1918).
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case such a result is impossible. The only solution of this problem
seems to be a definite statutory enactment by the legislature, permitting attachment of the property of a nonresident respondent in
a divorce action. Such statutes exist in a number of states, a good
example being that in Massachusetts, 9 and it is suggested that the
West Virginia legislature should enact such a statute.
J.E . C.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

BANKRUPTCY

-

CONSTITUTIONALITY

Wright, a Virginia
THE AtENDED FRAZIER-LEmKE ACT.farmer, petitioned for relief under the amended Frazier-Lemke
Act,' providing for a three-year debt moratorium for insolvent
farm owners. A mortgagee moved that the case be dismissed on the
ground that the Act was unconstitutional in that it effected a deprivation of creditors' property without due process of law. The
district court sustained the motion,2 and the judgment was affirmed
by the circuit court of appeals.' The Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Held, that the amended Frazier-Lemke Act is constitutional, not being in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Judgment reversed. Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain
Trust Bank of Roanoke, Va.4
The first Frazier-Lemke Act' provided that if a farmer were
unable to obtain a composition under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy
Act,0 his property should be appraised, and he might, if the
creditor consented, purchase the property at the appraised value,
agreeing to make deferred payments of the purchase price. If the
creditor refused his assent, all proceedings should be stayed for
five years, the debtor retaining possession of the property under
the supervision of the court, paying a reasonable rental. At the
end of five years the debtor might pay into court the appraised
value of the property and be discharged. The Supreme Court held
this Act unconstitutional in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
OF

9 "Upon a libel by a wife for divorce for a cause accruing after marriage,
the real and personal property of the husband may be attached to secure suitable support and maintenance to her and to such children as may be committed
to her care and custody." Mass. Gen. Laws 1932, c. 208, § 12.
149 Stat. 943-955 (1935), 11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (s)
2
In Te Sherman, 12 F. Supp. 297 (1935).

(1927).

3 Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Co. of Roanoke, Va., 85
F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
4 57 S. Ct. 556 (1937).
5 BANiupTOY AcT § 75(s), 4S Stat. 1289 (1934).
6 11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (1927).
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